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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
On December 20, 2010, the District Court orally granted Defendants' Motions to 
Dismiss. (R389) On January 31, 2011, the District Court issued its Ruling and Order 
Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and dismissing Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 
with prejudice. (Addendum at 12-14 (hereinafter "Add._"); R397-399) This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether a health care provider owes a duty of care to the children of a 
woman murdered by the health care provider's patient, when the complaint alleges 
that the health care provider's negligence in prescribing incorrect psychiatric 
medication was a proximate cause of the patient's violent conduct. 
The issue was the subject of a Motion for to Dismiss, which is reviewed under a 
correctness standard, with no deference to the trial court's decision. Wagner v. Clifton, 
2002 UT 109, \ 8, 62 P.3d 440. Plaintiffs filed a timely Notice of Appeal (R402-404), 
which preserved this error for appeal. Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
II. Whether a guilty plea to a murder charge by Plaintiffs' father for 
killing Plaintiffs' mother collaterally estops Plaintiffs from litigating the question of 
whether the medications prescribed by Defendants were a proximate cause of their 
father's violent conduct. 
The District Court ruled in Plaintiffs favor on this issue. Plaintiffs list it as an 
issue for view in the event Defendants argue that this is an alternative ground for 
affirmance. If Defendants raise the issue, it was the subject of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and would therefore be reviewed for correctness, with all facts and 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom viewed in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist., 2002 UT 130, % 13, 63 P.3d 705. 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional or statutory provisions central to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The facts are simple but profoundly tragic. David Ragsdale went for psychiatric 
care to defendant Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic in Draper, where he was treated 
by Defendant Trina West ("Nurse West"), an advanced family nurse practitioner. Nurse 
West was soon prescribing a cocktail of seven drugs, including psycho stimulants, 
tranquilizers, antidepressants and steroids. David displayed toxic side effects from these 
medications prior to his last visit with Nurse West. 
On January 6, 2008, Mr. Ragsdale shot Kristy Ragsdale, his wife and Plaintiffs' 
mother, thirteen times, in broad daylight, in the parking lot of a church, in front of 
multiple witnesses. Mr. Ragsdale subsequently pled guilty to murder, stating at his 
sentencing hearing that, while guilty, he believed he would not have committed the 
murder had he not been taking the drugs prescribed by Nurse West. 
This case is brought by William M. Jeffs, the guardian of the Ragsdales' children, 
who are now left with no mother, and a father in prison for life. The Amended 
Complaint alleges that the medications were not appropriate for this patient, that Nurse 
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West failed to consult with a physician as required by statute, and that the medications 
were a proximate cause of Mr. Ragsdale's violent outburst. 
The District Court granted Defendants5 Motions to Dismiss, ruling that even if 
Defendants' negligence was a proximate cause of Mr. Ragsdale's violent outburst, 
Defendants owed no duty of care to Plaintiffs because a health care provider owes a duty 
of care only to a patient. Since Mr. Ragsdale was Defendants' patient, not his children, 
Plaintiffs could not bring a tort claim of any kind. (Add. 13) 
Defendants argued in the alternative that, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, 
Mr. Ragsdale's guilty plea to a charge of murder foreclosed his children from litigating 
the question of whether the drugs prescribed by Defendants were a proximate cause of 
Mr. Ragsdale's violent outburst. The District Court stated that were it to have reached 
this issue, it would have rejected this argument because Plaintiffs were not a party to the 
criminal proceeding. (Add. 13) 
The Course Of Proceedings And Disposition In The District Court 
Mr. Ragsdale's children, through their Conservator William Jeffs, filed this 
lawsuit on April 19, 2010. (Rl-15) An Amended Complaint was filed on April 30, 2010 
(Add. 1-11; R19-29). The Amended Complaint alleges negligence against Defendant 
West ("Nurse West") based on her improper treatment of David Ragsdale (Count I), 
negligence against Defendant Dr. Rodier for his failure to consult with Nurse West or 
monitor in any way the treatment she was providing Mr. Ragsdale (Count II), and 
liability against Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic for the negligence of its 
employees, Nurse West and Dr. Rodier. (Count III). (Add.6-10) 
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On May 28, 2011, Defendant West filed a Motion to Dismiss and Alternative 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R37-113) The Motion to Dismiss argued that no duty 
of care was owed to Plaintiffs, and the alternative Motion for Summary Judgment argued 
that Mr. Ragsdale's guilty plea in his criminal proceeding collaterally estopped Plaintiffs 
from litigating whether the drugs prescribed by Defendants were a proximate cause of his 
conduct. Defendants Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic and Rodier joined in 
Defendant West's Motion. (Rl 14-117; R218-219). 
On December 20, 2010, Judge Lindberg orally granted the Motion to Dismiss, 
ruling that Defendants did not owe Plaintiffs a duty as a matter of law. (Add.26-27) 
Judge Lindberg also stated that, were the court to have reached the alternative Motion for 
Summary Judgment, it would have rejected the argument that Plaintiffs' claims were 
barred by collateral estoppel. A written order was entered on January 31, 2011. 
(Add.12-14) This appeal was timely filed on February 4, 2011. (R402-404) 
Statement Of Facts 
The Amended Complaint alleges that on or about April 16, 2007, David Ragsdale 
began a regular course of treatment at the Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic with 
defendant Trina West ("Nurse West"), an advanced family nurse practitioner. (Add.3 at 
112) Nurse West began by prescribing two powerful steroids, both of which have a risk 
of causing psychiatric complications. (Add.3 at fflf 13-14) 
At subsequent visits, Nurse West increased the dosages of the steroids, and added 
a prescription for Concerta, the brand name for the psycho stimulant drug 
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methylphenidate. (Add.3 at ff 18, 21-22). Nurse West subsequently doubled the dosage 
of Concerta, and later added prescriptions for additional drugs. (Add.4 at 127, 30) 
Nurse practitioners are required to "consult" with a physician when prescribing 
Schedule II and III drugs. Utah Code Ann. §58-31b-502(15). Two of the drugs Nurse 
West prescribed for Mr. Ragsdale, Concerta and Testosterone, fall into this category. 
The Amended Complaint alleges, however, that at no time did Nurse West consult 
defendant Dr. Rodier or any other doctor. (Add.3 at ^ 17; Add.4 at f^ 24, 27) Indeed, 
although never ruled upon, Dr. Rodier separately moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that he could not be liable because he never spoke to Nurse West about Mr. Ragsdale. 
(R330-360) 
On December 21, 2007, Mr. Ragsdale informed Nurse West that he was having 
marital problems and that a restraining order had been entered against him by his wife, 
Kristy Ragsdale. (Add.4 at ^ 28) After this visit, however, David Ragsdale was 
simultaneously taking the following combination of drugs based on prescriptions from 
Nurse West, all without the involvement of a physician (Add.4 at f^ 30): 
• The psychostimulant Concerta 
• The tranquilizer Valium 
• The antidepressant Doxepin 
• The antidepressant Paxil 
• The steroid Pregnenolone 
• The steroid Testosterone 
On January 8, 2008, with all of these drugs in his system, David Ragsdale shot and 
killed his wife, Kristy Ragsdale. (Add.5 at f 31, 33) The Amended Complaint alleges 
that there was no medical justification for prescribing this mixture of drugs in the dosages 
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prescribed by Nurse West, and that these drugs were a direct, proximate, and foreseeable 
cause of David Ragsdale's violent outburst. (Add.6,7 at ^ 35) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Did Defendants owe a duty of care? As is often the case in challenging tort 
claims, the key issue is whether Defendants owed Plaintiffs a duty of care. Defendants 
Motion to Dismiss did not question the adequacy of Plaintiffs' allegations of negligence 
or proximate causation. The question is whether a health care provider owes a duty of 
care to those injured by a patient, when the allegation is that the health care provider was 
a cause of the patient inflicting those injuries. 
Critical to this inquiry is the fact is that Defendants' negligence was an affirmative 
act; in this case, prescribing drugs that are alleged to have been a cause of Mr. Ragsdale 
violent outburst. The typical case against health care provider arising out of the violent 
acts of a patient alleges inaction; typically, a failure to warn or restrain an individual that 
the health care provider has reason to know may become violent. That Defendants here 
are alleged to have been a cause of their patient's violent conduct, not merely that they 
failed to prevent it, is a unique fact and critical from an analytical point of view because 
tort law is more apt to find a duty of care when affirmative acts are involved as opposed 
to a failure to act. Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5 ed. 1984), §56 at 378 
("When we cross the line into the field of 'misfeasance,' liability is far easier to find"). 
Defendants first argued for an absolute rule that only a patient is owed a duty of 
care. The District Court agreed, ruling that only a patient can bring a negligence claim 
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against a health care provider, and since Plaintiffs were not Defendants' patients, they 
have no cause of action. 
That ruling, however, misses abundant authority in both case law and the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act that there is no such rule. If an injury is foreseeable, a 
health care provider, like any other person, owes a duty of care. The District Court was 
persuaded to limit negligence actions against health care providers to patients by two 
appellate court decisions that ruled that plaintiffs who were not patients of a doctor could 
not bring a claim against the doctor. Those two decisions, however, dealt with situations 
in which an employer hires a doctor to test employees for the employer's benefit, not the 
employee. The ruling that in those situations the employees are not owed a duty of care 
by the doctor does not support a broad rule that health care providers never owe a duty to 
third-parties injured by their patients. 
Defendants also argued that a duty of care to those injured by a patient arises only 
where there is a special relationship between the health care provider and the injured 
party. (The District Court did not reach this issue.) This Court, however, ruled in Webb 
v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, 125 P.3d 906, that a special relationship is required 
only for cases based on omissions, or against governmental employees. Since this case 
alleges affirmative acts, by private individuals, no special relationship need be shown. 
Does collateral estoppel apply? Defendants argued, in the alternative, that Mr. 
Ragsdale's guilty plea to a charge of murder collaterally estops Plaintiffs from litigating 
the question of whether the drugs prescribed by Defendants were a cause of Mr. 
Ragsdale's conduct. Assuming Defendants assert this as an alternative basis for 
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affirmance, Plaintiffs will demonstrate that collateral estoppel applies in a subsequent 
proceeding only against those who were parties to the first proceeding. Since Plaintiffs 
were not parties to the criminal case against Mr. Ragsdale, there is no collateral estoppel. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Defendants Owed Plaintiffs A Duty Of Care 
Introduction 
Determining whether a defendant owes a duty of care is a question of law. 
Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2009 UT 44, ^ 17, 215 P.3d 152. "A duty, in 
negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition 
and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another." Id. at \ 19. It 
is, as this Court has characterized it, "the product of policy judgments applied to 
relationships." Id. 
The most critical fact in this case is that Defendants' negligence consists of 
affirmative conduct. The core allegation of the Amended Complaint is that the drugs 
prescribed by Nurse West were not only inappropriate for this patient, they were a 
foreseeable cause of the patient's violent conduct. This allegation affects the duty 
analysis in two regards. First, the alleged negligence involves the failure to choose the 
right course of treatment, which goes to the very heart of the professional responsibility 
of a health care provider. There are many cases both in Utah and elsewhere in which 
courts limit the circumstances in which a duty is imposed on health care providers 
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concerning the injuries inflicted by their patients,1 but in virtually all of those cases, the 
health care provider prescribed the proper treatment, and is alleged only to have failed to 
warn potential victims, or to have restrained the patient in some way. Finding a duty in 
those circumstances imposes an extra layer of responsibility on a health care provider 
who has chosen the right course of treatment. No such extra responsibility is sought to be 
imposed here. Imposing a duty here requires only that health care providers choose a 
medically acceptable course of treatment. 
The second reason this core allegation is critical is because tort law has long 
distinguished between malfeasance and nonfeasance, showing a much greater reluctance 
to find the existence of a duty when the negligence is a failure to act. Good 
samaritanship may be applauded, but it is generally not legally required. This distinction 
between malfeasance and a failure to act reflects a basic philosophical underpinning of 
our legal system: 
There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and more 
fundamental than that between misfeasance and non-feasance, between 
active misconduct working positive injury to others and passive inaction, a 
failure to take positive steps to benefit others, or to protect them from harm 
not created by any wrongful act of the defendant. This distinction is 
founded on that attitude of extreme individualism so typical of anglo-saxon 
legal thought. 
Philip W. Romohr, A Right/duty Perspective on the Legal and Philosophical Foundations 
oftheNo-Duty-to-RescueRule, 55 Duke LJ. 1025, 1030-31 (2006) {quoting Bohlen, The 
Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. Pa. L. Rev. 217 (1908)). 
See, 1 Am. Law Med. Malp. §3:16, Duty owed to nonpatient third parties. 
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There is no such reluctance to impose a duty when the defendant is alleged to have 
affirmatively acted in a way that increased the likelihood of harm. As bluntly stated in 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5 ed. 1984), §56 at 378: When we cross the 
line into the field of 'misfeasance/ liability is far easier to find."2 
Putting aside the malfeasance/nonfeasance distinction, this Court has emphasized 
the following factors as central in determining whether a duty of care is owed to a 
particular plaintiff: 
A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the 
law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of 
conduct toward another, [citation omitted] A court determines whether a 
duty exists by analyzing the legal relationship between the parties, the 
foreseeability of injury, the likelihood of injury, public policy as to which 
party can best bear the loss occasioned by the injury, and other general 
policy considerations, [citation omitted] Legal duty, then, is the product of 
policy judgments applied to relationships. 
Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., supra at % 19. 
2
 See also, Univ. of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 57 (Colo. 1987) ("In determining 
whether a defendant owes a duty ... the law has long recognized a distinction between 
action and a failure to act"); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 357 
(Tenn. 2008) ("With regard to misfeasance, this Court has held that 'all persons have a 
duty to use reasonable care to refrain from conduct that will foreseeably cause injury to 
others.' ... As for nonfeasance, Tennessee's courts generally have declined to impose a 
duty to act or to rescue"); Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc., 429 Mich. 495, 
498, 418 N.W.2d 381, 382 (1988) ("In determining standards of conduct in the area of 
negligence, the courts have made a distinction between misfeasance, or active 
misconduct causing personal injury, and nonfeasance, which is passive inaction or the 
failure to actively protect others from harm"); Seo v. All-Makes Overhead Doors, 97 Cal. 
App. 4th 1193, 1202, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160, 166 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) ("a distinction is 
drawn between claims of liability based upon misfeasance and those based upon 
nonfeasance"). 
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Defendants focused less on these factors, however, than on two points they argue 
preclude finding a duty: (1) the lack of a health care provider/patient relationship, and (2) 
the lack of a "special relationship." Plaintiffs will examine these two issues, therefore, 
before returning the Normandeau factors. 
A. Non-patients can bring negligence actions. 
The District Court ruled Plaintiffs could not "step into the shoes" of David 
Ragsdale, Defendants' patient. (Add. 13) To refute this, one need look no farther than 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (UT 1993), a case in which this Court 
permitted a claim against, among others, a physician, by the victim of an attack by a 
mental patient. Although the Court undertook a careful analysis of the requirements for 
asserting a failure to warn claim in these circumstances, the fact that the victim was not 
the defendant's patient was not even an issue. 
Courts also routinely permit actions by the family members of those aggrieved by 
a health care provider's negligence. E.g., Jensen v. IHC Hospital, Inc., 314 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 24, 944 P.2d 327 (UT 1997) (patient's family brought wrongful death action based 
on defendant's malpractice). Under the District Court's absolute rule, such actions would 
not be pei^nissible. 
3
 Several other decisions by this Court have ruled that claims by the victims of an attack 
by mental patient were not permitted (these cases are discussed in Section B, below), but 
none did so based on a rule that only patients can sue health care providers. See, Ferree 
v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149 (UT 1989) (no claim for failure to warn because there was 
no reason to suspect violence); Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156 (UT 1991) (no duty to 
protect because no "special relationship" with plaintiff); Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 
969 P.2d 416 (UT 1998) (no duty to warn because no "special relationship"). 
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The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act also demonstrates that people other than 
patients can bring actions against doctors. The Act's statute of limitations provides that 
claims must be brought within "two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers" the 
malpractice.4 Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-404. Similarly, the Nurse Practice Act Rule 
provides that nurses must "take preventive measures to protect patient, others, and self." 
R156-31b-704(2)(o) (emphasis added).5 Thus, multiple statutes contemplate actions 
against health care providers by non-patients. 
The District Court was likely swayed by two appellate court decision cited by 
Defendants, Wilcox v. Salt Lake City, 484 P.2d 1200, 26 Utah 2d 78 (1971), and Joseph 
v. McCann, 2006 UT App 459, 147 P.3d 547. Both dealt with the situation in which 
doctors are hired by an employer or government agency to conduct examinations of 
applicants for the benefit of the employer or government agency. Because the doctors 
were hired by the employer or government agency, the exam was conducted solely for 
the benefit of that entity. The courts consequently held that the person being examined 
was not the doctor's patient, and thus the doctor owed no duty to that person. In Wilcox, 
for example, the city hired doctors to examine those applying for waitresses' permits to 
4
 The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act also provides that in order to bring an action 
based on lack of informed consent, a plaintiff must show "that a provider-patient 
relationship existed between the patient and health care provider." Utah Code Ann §78B-
3-406. Because the Act specifically requires such a relationship as one element of this 
kind of claim (which is not involved here), by implication a provider-patient relationship 
is not required for other kinds of malpractice actions. 
5
 In Osborne v. United States, 166 F.Supp. 2d 479, 499 (S.D.W. Va. 2001), the court held 
that third-part actions against doctors were permitted under West Virginia law because 
the medical malpractice statute provided for claims by "persons," not just "patients." 
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see if they met the qualifications for a permit. In Joseph, the city hired doctors to 
examine police officers to determine their fitness for duty. In both cases, the court held 
that the only duty the doctors had was the contractual duty they owed to the entity that 
hired them. As the Court in Joseph summed up the principle being applied {Joseph, 
supra at1! 15): 
a physician who is retained by a third party to conduct an examination of 
another person and report the results to that third party does not enter in a 
physician-patient relationship with the examinee and is not liable to the 
examinee for any losses he suffers as a result of the conclusions the 
physician reaches or reports. 
Defendants seized on statements in those decisions - that you need a physician 
patient relationship to create a duty - that were intended to deal with the specific situation 
of a third-party hiring doctors to conduct medical examinations for the benefit of the third 
party. The lack of a physician-patient relationship when a doctor is hired by a third-party 
is dispositive in those situations because the person being examined would have no basis 
for claiming that the doctor owed him or her a duty. These decisions were never intended 
to create a general rule that only patients can sue doctors, and they have never been cited 
for that proposition.6 
The rule stated in Joseph and Wilcox is consistent with the rule in virtually all other 
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Rand v. Miller, 185 W. Va. 705, 707, 408 S.E.2d 655, 657 (1991) 
("where a physician is hired by an employer to conduct a physical examination of an 
actual or prospective employee, ordinarily there is no professional relationship upon 
which to base a medical malpractice claim by such employee"). Yet, we are aware of no 
jurisdiction applying this rule to generally bar claims against doctors by non-patients. 
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Nor would the rule suggested by the District Court make any sense. Consider the 
situation in which a doctor negligently prescribes medication to someone about to drive a 
car and the medication causes the driver to crash and injure third parties. Under 
Defendants suggested interpretation of Wilcox and Joseph, those injured by the impaired 
driver would have no cause of action because they were not the doctor's patients. While 
there is no case on this type of situation in Utah, courts in many other jurisdictions have 
held that health care providers owe a duty to someone injured by an automobile driven by 
an impaired patient. See, e.g., Taylor v. Smith, 892 So.2d 887 (Ala. 2004); Osborne v. 
United States, 166 F.Supp.2d 479, 499 (S.D.W. Va. 2001) ("It was foreseeable and 
known also that this known alcohol and drug abuser, who routinely disregarded warnings 
given by health care professionals, would operate a motor vehicle while impaired"); 
Wilschinsky v. Medina, 108 N.M. 511, 515, 775 P.2d 713, 717 (1989) ("we find Dr. 
Straight owed a duty to the driving public when he administered these drugs to Helen 
Medina under these particular circumstances"). 
Similarly, what if a health care provider negligently allowed a patient with a 
highly communicable disease to mingle in the general population? Surely the health care 
provider owes a duty to third-parties that would be infected by his or her patient. E.g., 
DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, Inc., 525 Pa. 558, 561-62, 583 A.2d 422, 424 
(1990) ("When a physician treats a patient who has been exposed to or who has 
7
 See, 43 A.L.R.4th 153, Liability of physician, for injury to or death of third party, due to 
failure to disclose driving-related impediment. 
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contracted a communicable and/or contagious disease, it is imperative that the physician 
give his or her patient the proper advice about preventing the spread of the disease"). 
In sum, the absolute rule imposed by the District Court finds no support in 
precedent or in sensible public policy. 
B. Plaintiffs were not required to allege a "special relationship/' 
Defendants argued below that no duty could exist unless Plaintiffs showed a 
"special relationship" between Defendants and Plaintiffs. (R51,52) The argument is 
based on a series of decisions issued by this Court between 1986 and 2002 on what 
constitutes the "special relationship" necessary to impose a duty of care in certain 
situations. See, Beech v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (UT 1986); Perree v. Utah, 
784 P.2d 149 (UT 1989); Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156 (UT 1991); Higgins v. Salt 
Lake County, 855 P.2d 331 (UT 1993); Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 353 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 28, 969 P.2d 416 (UT 1998); and Young v. Salt Lake City School Dist, 2002 UT 64, 
52P.3dl230. 
Of these cases, Ferree, Rollins, Higgins, and Wilson involved claims against 
health care providers or prison officials by those injured as a result of violent acts by 
mental patients or criminals. Defendants relied heavily on these decisions in arguing that 
Plaintiffs' claim fails because Defendants had no "special relationship" with Plaintiffs. 
The "special relationship" argument, however, does not hold up in light of this 
Court's ruling in Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, 125 P.3d 906. In Webb, this 
o 
The District Court did not reach this issue. We address it in the event Defendants raise 
it as an alternative ground for affirmance. 
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Court untangled the dual use of the term "special relationship" as used in determining 
whether a defendant owes a duty of care. In cases against private individuals, the 
plaintiff has to show a "special relationship" only where a claim is based on an omission 
or a failure to act (Id. at f^ 10): 
The court of appeals correctly observed that as a general proposition of tort 
law, the distinction between acts and omissions is central to assessing 
whether a duty is owed a plaintiff Webb, 2004 UT App 56, If 6 n. 3, 88 
P.3d 364, see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302 (1965). In almost 
every instance, an act carries with it a potential duty and resulting legal 
accountability for that act. By contrast, an omission or failure to act can 
generally give rise to liability only in the presence of some external 
circumstance - a special relationship. 
Claims against government officials are treated differently because the role of 
government is to protect the public, and governmental actors need more protection. The 
courts hold, therefore, that governmental actors are not normally liable to the general 
public for their actions (Id. at f 11): 
As a matter of public policy, we do not expose governmental actors to tort 
liability for all mishaps that may befall the public in the course of 
conducting their duties, [citation omitted] Doing otherwise would have the 
likely effect of reducing the pool of potential public servants. Our search 
for sound public policy has led us, however, to decide that governmental 
actors should be answerable in tort when their negligent conduct causes 
injury to persons who stand so far apart from the general public that we can 
describe them as having a special relationship to the governmental actor. 
The term "special relationship," therefore, has two uses. In claims against the 
government, a special relationship is always required because the governmental actors do 
not have a duty to the general public. In claims against private individuals, a special 
relationship is necessary if the claim is based on omission, which yet again reflects of the 
critical distinction malfeasance and nonfeasance. See, e.g., Zelig v. County of Los 
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Angeles, 27 Cal. 4th 1112, 1129, 45 P.3d 1171, 1183 (Cal. 2002) ("[A] duty [to warn] 
may arise if '(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which 
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special 
relation exists between the actor and the other which gives the other a right to protection.' 
... 'This rule derives from the common law's distinction between misfeasance and 
nonfeasance, and its reluctance to impose liability for the latter'"). 
Under Webb, the "special relationship" analysis in this case is quite simple. The 
Amended Complaint alleges affirmative acts of negligence, not omissions, by private 
actors, not governmental officials. Defendants, private health care providers, are alleged 
to have negligently prescribed medications, which were a cause of Mr. Ragsdale's violent 
outburst. Under Webb, therefore, there is no need to allege or prove the existence of a 
special relationship between Defendants and Plaintiffs. 
The Webb distinction between acts and omissions for claims against private 
individuals is one deeply rooted in tort law. As explained in Prosser and Keeton on the 
Law of Torts (5th ed. 1984), §56 at 373-73: 
In the determination of the existence of a duty, there runs through much of 
the law a distinction between action and inaction. ... The reason for the 
distinction may be said to lie in the fact that by "misfeasance" the defendant 
has created a new risk of harm to the plaintiff, while by "nonfeasance" he 
has at least made his situation no worse, and has merely failed to benefit 
him by interfering in his affairs Liability for "misfeasance," then, may 
extend to any person to whom harm may reasonably be anticipated as a 
result of defendant's conduct, or perhaps even beyond; while for 
"nonfeasance it is necessary to find some definite relation between the 
parties, of such a character that social policy justifies the imposition of a 
duty to act. 
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The Webb decision shows why this Court's prior cases involving claims arising 
out of injuries inflicted by mental patients are inapplicable. Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 
(UT 1989), Rollins v. Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156 (UT 1991), mdHiggins v. Salt Lake 
County, 855 P.2d 231 (UT 1993), were claims against governmental entities or actors. 
Consistent with the holding in Webb, those plaintiffs were obligated to show a "special 
relationship" between the defendant governmental entity and the victim, rather than just a 
foreseeable risk of harm. 
The only case against a non-governmental defendant, Wilson v. Valley Mental 
Health, 969 P.2d 416 (UT 1998), involved a negligence claim by relatives of a murder 
victim against a mental health hospital based on a failure to warn and failure to properly 
restrain a violent individual. Since that case was based on an alleged failure to act, this 
Court held, consistent with its later holding in Webb, that there could be no negligence 
because there was no special relationship between the patient and the victim.9 
9
 Even if, contrary to the holding in Webb, Plaintiffs were required to allege a "special 
relationship," the Amended Complaint would satisfy that requirement. In Higgins v. Salt 
Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (UT 1993), an individual stabbed by a mentally ill patient 
sued the public mental health facility for negligence. The Court found an issue of fact on 
whether there was a special relationship because there is the requisite "special 
relationship" if the defendant knows that the patient is likely to harm persons reasonably 
identifiable either individually or as members of a group (Id. at 238): 
it must be shown that the custodian knew or should have known that unless 
steps were taken to protect others from the detainee, he or she was "likely" 
to cause bodily harm to persons who were "reasonably identifiable by the 
custodian either individually or as members of a distinct group." 
Cont'd. 
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In sum, Plaintiffs' claim is not subject to the "special relationship" requirement. 
C. The Normandeau factors show that 
Defendants owed a duty of care. 
Once the "only a patient can sue" and "special relationship" arguments are 
eliminated, there remains the question of whether a duty should be imposed on the health 
care providers under the facts of this case. This Court has repeatedly held that whether a 
duty exists must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Among the factors to be considered 
are the following: 
A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the 
law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of 
conduct toward another, [citation omitted] A court determines whether a 
duty exists by analyzing the legal relationship between the parties, the 
foreseeability of injury, the likelihood of injury, public policy as to which 
party can best bear the loss occasioned by the injury, and other general 
policy considerations, [citation omitted] Legal duty, then, is the product of 
policy judgments applied to relationships. 
Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 2009 UT 44, f 19, 215 P.3d 152. 
The facts alleged in the Amended Complaint make a compelling case for the 
existence of a duty under these factors. 
The "legal relationship between the parties:" Defendants were heath care 
providers treating Plaintiffs' father, David Ragsdale, during a time when Defendants 
A duty makes sense in these situations, the Court observed, because (Id): 
the identification of a victim and a means has made it feasible for the 
custodian to take concrete steps to prevent the harm. 
The Amended Complaint alleges that Kristy Ragsdale had secured a protective 
order against David Ragsdale, and that Defendants were aware of this. Thus, Kristy 
Ragsdale was a "reasonably identifiable" potential victim, creating a "special 
relationship" if such is required to establish a duty. 
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knew that there were serious marital problems between their patient and his estranged 
wife (Plaintiffs' mother). The marital problems had reached a threshold that caused 
Kristy Ragsdale to request and to receive a court-ordered protective order against 
Defendants' patient. (Add.4 at ^ 28) The legal relationship between the parties, 
therefore, is that of a health care provider and the family of the patient being treated. 
Consider how this would have played out had Mr. Ragsdale committed suicide 
instead of murdering his wife, and his family members brought this claim. Claims of this 
nature are routinely permitted if the suicide is shown to have been foreseeable. E.g., 
Edwards v. Tardif, 240 Conn. 610, 616, 692 A.2d 1266, 1269 (Conn. 1997) ("suicide will 
not break the chain of causation if it was a foreseeable result of the defendant's tortious 
act"); Patton v. Thompson, 958 So. 2d 303, 313 (Ala. 2006) ("plaintiff in a medical-
malpractice action against a psychiatrist arising out of the suicide of the psychiatrist's 
patient must prove ... that the breach was a proximate cause of the patient's death"); 
Cowan v. Doering, 111 N.J. 451, 462, 545 A.2d 159, 164 (N.J. 1988) ("This duty of care 
to prevent self-inflicted harm arises in this case because there was a foreseeable risk that 
plaintiffs condition ... included the danger that she would injure herself). 
Since claims by family members of those who commit suicide are permitted, it 
would make little sense to bar claims where the patient, instead of taking his or her own 
life, takes the life of a family member. 
The "foreseeability of injury:" Normandeau held that "[wjhether a harm was 
foreseeable in the context of determining duty depends on the general foreseeability of 
such harm, not whether the specific mechanism of the harm could be foreseen." 2009 UT 
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44 at J^ 20. It is not necessary, therefore, that the eventual shooting have been 
foreseeable, but only the general fact that Mr. Ragsdale might seek to harm his estranged 
wife. Here, the Amended Complaint specifically alleges that the violent outburst was a 
foreseeable result of Defendants' negligence (Add.7 at ^ 36-37), and that fact must be 
taken as true on a Motion to Dismiss. 
Plaintiffs recognize that courts exercise caution before imposing liability for the 
intentional acts of others, particularly when the individuals involved are having 
psychiatric problems.10 This Court, however, specifically dealt with the question of the 
imposition of a duty of care when a criminal act is involved, and ruled that a duty exists if 
a defendant creates an unreasonably enhanced danger of a criminal act: 
Many jurisdictions have held that under "special" or "unusual" 
circumstances, a duty may exists where a defendant should reasonably 
anticipate that its conduct will create an unreasonably enhanced danger to 
one in the position of the injured plaintiffs. If such danger is foreseeable, 
then a duty arises to exercise reasonable care for the safety of other. 
Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Utah 1996). 
Many courts have noted the difficulty of predicting when a mentally ill patient will 
commit an act of violence. E.g., Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 39 
Ohio St. 3d 86, 97, 529 N.E.2d 449, 459 (Ohio 1988) ("Though a psychiatrist's ability to 
predict violent behavior is probably better than a layperson's, and there does appear to be 
some consensus within the mental health community on the factors relevant to a 
diagnosis of violent propensities, diagnosing both the existence of violent propensities 
and their severity is still a highly subjective undertaking"). These cases, however, 
involve claims of omission - usually a failure to warn, or a failure to keep a person 
confined - and thus the courts look for a "special relationship" before imposing a duty of 
care. A different analysis is required here because Defendants are alleged to have 
triggered the violence conduct, not merely failed to warn. 
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Cruz involved an auto dealership that consistently left keys in its cars, despite 
repeated thefts. A car was stolen, and the thief crashed and injured the plaintiffs. The 
Court allowed the claim to proceed because "the theft of the car and its negligent 
operation may have been foreseeable...." Id. 
The Cruz holding is consistent the consensus view on this point. The Restatement 
of Torts 2d, for example, provides in Section 302 B: 
As act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realized or should 
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the 
conduct of the other of a third person which is intended to cause harm, even 
though such conduct is criminal. 
Accord, Jupin v. Kask, 447 Mass. 141, 148, 849 N.E.2d 829, 836 (Mass. 2006) ("a third 
party's criminal conduct is not unforeseeable if 'the actor at the time of his negligent 
conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that... a third person might avail 
himself of the opportunity to commit such a ... crime'"). 
The Amended Complaint makes a more compelling case for the imposition of a 
duty than Cruz, because it alleges that Mr. Ragsdale's violent actions were not only 
foreseeable, they were caused in part by Defendants' negligent prescription of certain 
drugs. The Amended Complaint, therefore, alleges the special circumstances required 
under Cruz to find the criminal conduct of another foreseeable. 
The fact that the claim is based on affirmative acts plays an important role here, as 
well. Courts in other jurisdictions have noted the act/omission dichotomy impacts the 
question of whether someone is responsible for the acts of a third party: 
"[A] person is ordinarily not liable for the actions of another and is under 
no duty to protect another from harm, in the absence of a special 
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relationship of custody or control." ... This well-established principle of 
California tort jurisprudence, which may be appropriately referred to as the 
"no duty to aid" rule, is "based on the concept that a person should not be 
liable for 'nonfeasance' in failing to act as a 'good Samaritan.' It has no 
application where the defendant, through his or her own action 
{misfeasance) has made the plaintiffs position worse and has created a 
foreseeable risk of harm from the third person. In such cases the question of 
duty is governed by the standards of ordinary care. 
Romero v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 4th 1068, 1079, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 801, 809 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis in original). 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts makes the same distinction, pointing out in 
Comment e to Section 302 B (quoted above) the difference between acts and omissions: 
There are, however, situations in which the actor, as a reasonable man, is 
required to anticipate and guard against the intentional, or even criminal, 
misconduct of others. In general, these situations arise where the actor is 
under a special reasonability toward the one who suffers the harm, which 
includes the duty to protect him against such intentional misconduct; or 
where the actor's own affirmative act has created or exposed the other to 
a recognizable high degree of risk of harm through such misconduct, 
which a reasonable man would take into account, (emphasis added) 
By any measure, therefore, the foreseeability allegations of the Amended 
Complaint make a strong case for finding a duty of care. 
The "likelihood of injury:" The Amended Complaint alleges that the drugs 
prescribed to David Ragsdale carry the risk of dangerous side effects, including violent 
outbursts. The Amended Complaint also alleges Defendants knew David Ragsdale was 
under a restraining order, and yet Defendants improperly continued to prescribe him a 
cocktail of psychiatric drugs which carry a risk of the same dangerous side effects. 
Plaintiffs alleged and are fully prepared to offer expert testimony that this negligence 
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made a violent outburst against Kristy Ragsdale likely. Thus, the pleading fulfils the 
"likelihood of injury requirement." 
The "public policy as to which party can best bear the loss:" The general 
principal is that those who are negligent should be accountable for the foreseeable 
consequences of their conduct, particularly, as noted above, in cases involved affirmative 
acts, rather than omissions: 
the public policy behind tort law is to hold tortfeasors accountable for 
harms occasioned by their fault. See generally Nabors Drilling, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. 2009) ("Liability is grounded in 
the public policy behind the law of negligence which dictates every person 
is responsible for injuries which are the reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of his act or omission."). Accordingly, as between an 
innocent party and a negligent tortfeasor, public policy requires that any 
loss should be born by the tortfeasor. 
Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 2010 UT App 121, TJ 4, 233 P.3d 546. 
There are several other policy considerations at work here that go beyond whether 
the injury Defendants caused was foreseeable. As noted several times, the key allegation 
is that Defendants prescribed drugs that were uncalled for in this situation, and further, 
that those drugs made a violent outburst more likely. Choosing the right treatment goes 
to the core of what health care providers must do, and it would be dangerous to find that 
health care providers owe no duty to those injured by a wrong course of treatment. 
There is also the allegation that Nurse West failed to consult with a physician,11 
something she was required to do (Utah Code § 58-31b-502(15)) when prescribing 
11
 As noted at page 5 above, Defendant Dr. Rodier filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
(that was never ruled upon) based on the fact that he claimed Nurse West never spoke to 
him about Mr. Ragsdale's treatment. (R3 3 0-3 60) 
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certain of the drugs involved here. The consultation requirement is a function of the 
more limited training nurses receive, and to fail to undertake a legal obligation of this 
nature creates an increased risk of the selection of a harmful course of treatment. Again, 
it would be dangerous to find that health care providers owe no duty of care to those 
injured when they fail to fulfill the basic legal obligations assigned to their profession. 
"k "k "k 
In sum, Plaintiffs will bear the burden of proving at trial that the drugs prescribed 
by Defendants were a cause of Mr. Ragsdale's violent outburst. If that burden is met, all 
policy considerations weigh in favor of finding that Defendants owed a duty of care to 
anyone injured by that outburst, particularly when those injured were the patient's 
immediate family members. 
II. Collateral Estoppel Does Not Apply To This Case. 
Introduction 
Defendants' alternative Motion for Summary Judgment argued that Mr. 
Ragsdale's guilty plea foreclosed Plaintiffs from trying to prove that the drugs prescribed 
by Defendants were a cause of his conduct. The District Court did not reach this issue, 
but ruled that if it were to have reached this issue, it would have rejected Defendants' 
argument. (Add. 13) We offer argument on this issue in the event Defendants raise it as 
an alternative ground for affirmance. 
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Three elements must be present to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel (also 
referred to as "issue preclusion"):12 
1. The party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party 
or in privity with a party in the prior litigation. 
2. The issue was completely, fully, and fairly litigated in the prior litigation. 
3. The issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue in the current 
litigation. Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, t 13, 99 P.3d 842. 
All three elements are absent. 
A, Plaintiffs were neither parties nor in privity 
with parties in the criminal proceeding. 
Plaintiffs were not parties to the criminal litigation, which was between the State 
and David Ragsdale. Defendants argued below that that Plaintiffs were "in privity" with 
the prosecution because of the input they were entitled to provide under the Rights of 
Crime Victims Act, Utah Code Ann. §77-38-1, et. seq. This argument ignores well 
established law on what constitutes "privity" for the purposes of collateral estoppel. 
In Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 205 UT 19, f 29, 110 
P.3d 678, this Court set out the test for privity as applied to collateral estoppel: 
We have stated that "a person in privity with another ... is a person so 
identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right." 
As examples, the Court noted the following: a mutually successive relationship to rights 
in property, a legal representative of another, a guardian and a ward, and a trustee and the 
12
 There is a fourth element, the requirement of a final judgment in the prior proceeding, 
but it is not disputed that the criminal proceeding resulted in a final judgment. 
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beneficiaries of the trust. See also, Press Publishing, Ltd. v. Matol Botanical Int., Ltd, 
2001 UT 106,1f 20, 37 P.3d 1121 (several purportedly separate corporate entities that are 
all affiliates or subsidiaries of the same corporate parent are in privity). 
There is no such relationship here between Plaintiffs, the victims of a crime, and 
the State of Utah. Under the Utah Rights of Crime Victims Act, Plaintiffs were entitled 
to be present and to be heard in the criminal proceeding. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-4. 
They had no control over the proceedings, and the prosecutor could have ignored their 
input. This limited right to be present and to be heard does not identify Plaintiffs with the 
interests of the prosecution in such a way that one can say that they represent the "same 
legal right." See, e.g., Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 692 (Utah 1978) (privity 
means you had the "right to cross-examine witnesses, control the proceedings or appeal 
from the judgment...."). There is no basis, therefore, for finding that the victims of a 
crime are in privity with the prosecution. To hold otherwise would lead to the cruel irony 
that the decision by a murderer to plead guilty limited the rights of his victims. 
B. The "issue" was not litigated in the prior proceeding. 
The "issue" Defendants claim Plaintiffs are barred from litigating is whether the 
drugs were a cause of Mr. Ragsdale's conduct. By pleading guilty, Mr. Ragsdale 
implicitly waived a defense based on involuntary intoxication, which might have 
involved the question of what role the drugs played in his conduct. Waiving a defense is 
not litigating an issue. The doctrine of issue preclusion is designed to prevent parties 
from litigating an issue twice and having two decisions on the same issue. Because he 
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pled guilty, there was never any litigation of, nor a decision on, the issue Defendants seek 
to apply collateral estoppel to. 
C. The "issue" is not identical. 
For collateral estoppel to apply the issue in the two cases must be "identical," not 
merely similar, and the issues in the criminal case and this civil lawsuit are materially 
different. Defendants argue that Mr. Ragsdale could have taken the position in the 
criminal case that he did not intentionally or knowingly kill his wife because of the drugs 
he was taking. Thus, by pleading guilty, Defendants argue, Mr. Ragsdale admitted the 
drugs were not a cause of his conduct. 
This does not show, however, that the issues in the two cases are "identical." The 
involuntary intoxication defense could only have been raised if it would have shown that 
Mr. Ragsdale lacked the mental state necessary to commit murder 
It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute or ordinance that the 
defendant, as a result of mental illness, lacked the mental state required as 
an element of the offense charged. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(l)(a). 
In a civil tort case, the issue is whether the drugs taken by Mr. Ragsdale were a 
proximate cause of his conduct. There can even be multiple proximate causes. 
Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), affd, 862 
P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993) ("there can be more than one proximate cause of an injury so long 
as each is a concurrent contributing factor in causing the injury"). This is a different 
issue than the question of whether Mr. Ragsdale "lacked the mental state required" to 
commit a crime. Put most simply, the issue of intent in the criminal case, and proximate 
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causation in a civil tort action, are not identical. For this additional reason, therefore, 
collateral estoppel does not apply. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reason stated in this Brief, Plaintiffs-Appellants respectfully request that 
this Court reverse the District Court's Order granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss 
and remanding this case for further proceedings. 
Dated this day of June, 2011. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
B. R., a minor child, and C. R., a minor 
child, through their conservator 
WILLIAM M. JEFFS, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
TRINA WEST, A.F.N.P, HUGO 
RODIER, M.D., and PIONEER 
COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL CLINIC 
and JOHN DOES I - X, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 100907025 
Judge : Denise Lindberg 
JURY TRIAL REQUESTED 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, Tyler S. Young and Allen 
K. Young of Young, Kester & Petro, and for cause of action against the defendants 
alleges as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiffs were residents of Utah County, 
Utah. 
2. At all times relevant hereto, Trina West, Advanced Family Nurse 
Practitioner (hereinafter "A.F.N.P."), was licensed by the State of Utah to practice 
nursing at her principle place of business in Draper, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
3. At all times relevant hereto, Hugo Rodier, M.D., was licensed by the State 
of Utah to practice medicine at his principle place of business in Draper, Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
4. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Pioneer Comprehensive Medical 
Clinic retained, hired, supervised and controlled its staff and employees, and supervised 
as well as controlled, through granting of medical privileges, its medical staff at its place 
of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
5. At all times relevant hereto, John Does I through X were persons or 
entities residing in or doing business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
6. The tortious acts complained of occurred in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
7. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter in accordance with the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated Utah Code Annotated 78A-5-102 (2008 as 
Amended). 
8. Venue is properly laid with this Court in accordance with the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78B-3-307 (2008 as Amended). 
9. Plaintiff has met the requirements of Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, 
Section 78B-3-412. 
FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION 
10. Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the 
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 9 and further allege as follows: 
11. Utah law allows an Advanced Family Nurse Practitioner, like Trina West, 
to prescribe "Schedule II and III" controlled substances only in "consultation with" a 
licensed medical doctor. 
12. On or about April 16, 2007 David Ragsdale began a regular course of 
treatment at Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic with Trina West, A.F.N.P. 
13. On or about April 16, 2007 Trina West, A.F.N.P., prescribed David 
Ragsdale two powerful steroids (Testosterone and Pregnenolone). 
14. The steroids Trina West, A.F.N.P., prescribed David Ragsdale both carry 
the risk of causing psychiatric complications such as steroid-induced mania. 
15. Mr. Ragsdale was prescribed those steroids with little to no medical 
inclination. 
16. Testosterone is a "Schedule III" controlled substance. 
17. Trina West, A.F.N.P., prescribed Mr. Ragsdale testosterone without 
consulting Dr. Hugo Rodier, M.D., or any other medical doctor. 
18. On or about May 2, 2007 Trina West, A.F.N.P., increased Mr. Ragsdale's 
doses of Testosterone and Pregnenolone. 
19. Trina West, A.F.N.P., increased Mr. Ragsdale's doses of the steroids 
without consulting Hugo Rodier M.D., or any other medical doctor. 
20. On or about July 9, 2007 Mr. Ragsdale had a follow up visit at the clinic. 
21. During that visit, Mr. Ragsdale was prescribed Concerta a "Schedule II" 
controlled substance by Trina West, A.F.N.P. 
22. Concerta is the brand name for the psychostimulant drug methylphenidate. 
23. Methylphenidate carries many of the same risks associated with 
methamphetamine. 
24. Trina West, A.F.N.P., prescribed David Ragsdale Concerta without 
consulting Hugo Rodier, M.D., or any other medical doctor. 
25. Trina West, A.F.N.P., diagnosed David Ragsdale with Attention Deficit 
Disorder (AD/HD), to justify the prescription for Concerta. 
26. On or about September 5, 2007, Trina West, A.F.N.P., doubled David 
Ragsdale's doses of Concerta from 36 mg to 72 mg per day. 
27. Trina West, A.F.N.P., doubled David Ragsdale's dose of Concerta without 
consulting Hugo Rodier, M.D., or any other medical doctor. 
28. On or before December 21, 2007, David Ragsdale represented to Trina 
West, A.F.N.P. that he was having marital problems and that a restraining order had been 
entered against him by his wife, Kxisty Ragsdale. 
29. On or before December 21, 2007, David Ragsdale was displaying toxic 
30. After a visit on or about December 21, 2007, and after several other visits 
at Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, David Ragsdale was being prescribed the 
following combination of psychotropic medications by Trina West, A.F.N.P.: 
• The psychostimulant Concerta at 54 mg daily 
• The tranquilizer Valium at 5 mg daily 
• The antidepressant Doxepin at 100 mg daily 
• The antidepressant Paxil at 40 mg daily 
• The steroid Pregnenolone at 600 mg daily 
• The hair-loss medication Propecia at 1 mg daily 
• The steroid Testosterone at 200 mg weekly by intramuscular inj ection 
31. On January 6, 2008, David Ragsdale shot his wife, Kristy Ragsdale (the 
mother of plaintiffs B.R. and C.R.), thirteen times in a church parking lot, in broad 
daylight, in front of several witnesses. 
32. Within two hours of the shooting, David Ragsdale turned himself in to the 
police. 
33. Blood toxicology reports taken from David Ragsdale show that he was 
within the prescribed ranges of all of his medications and that he had no illicit substances 
in his blood stream at the time of shooting. 
COUNT 1 
NEGLIGENCE OF TRINA WEST, A.F.N.P. 
34. Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the 
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 33 and further allege as follows: 
35. Trina West, A.F.N.P., was negligent in the following, but not limited to 
the following particulars: 
a. The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to consult with Hugo Rodier, M.D., 
or any other medical doctor prior to prescribing David Ragsdale Testosterone and/or 
Concerta. 
b. The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to consult with Hugo Rodier, M.D., 
or any other medical doctor prior to increasing David Ragsdale's doses of Testosterone 
and/or Concerta. 
c. The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to have a consultation plan with Hugo 
Rodier, M.D., or any other medical doctor prior to prescribing David Ragsdale 
Testosterone and/or Concerta. 
d. The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to have adequate justification for 
prescribing David Ragsdale the combination of medications he was being prescribed in 
the months leading up to the shooting of Kristy Ragsdale. 
e. The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to discontinue David Ragsdale's 
prescription regimen. 
f. The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to properly monitor, refer, and treat 
David Ragsdale. 
36. The negligence of Trina West A.F.N.P. was likely to cause the conduct 
toward Kristy Ragsdale that led to her shooting and death. 
37. The failures of Trina West A.F.N.P., were a direct, proximate, and 
foreseeable cause of the conduct that led to the shooting, as well as death, of Kristy 
Ragsdale. 
38. As a result of the negligence of Trina West, A.F.N.P., Plaintiffs have lost 
the care comfort, society, and support of their parents. 
39. The Plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe emotional 
distress as a result of the negligence of Trina West, A.F.N.P. 
COUNT 2 
NEGLIGENCE OF HUGO RODIER, M.D. 
40. Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the 
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 39 and further allege as follows: 
41. On information and belief, Hugo Rodier, M.D., was Trina West's 
supervising and/or "consulting" physician at Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic. 
42. Utah Law required Tina West, A.F.N.P., to have a "consultation plan" 
with a medical doctor which would allow her to then consult with a medical doctor to 
prescribe schedule II and III controlled substances to David Ragsdale. 
43. On information and belief, although Dr. Hugo Rodier, M.D., knew or 
should have known Trina West, A.F.N.P. was treating David Ragsdale, and prescribing 
David Ragsdale medications, no consultation plan existed between Hugo Rodier, M.D., 
and Trina West, A.F.N.P. 
44. The failure of Hugo Rodier, M.D., to follow the appropriate standard of 
care also includes, but is not limited to: 
2L The failure of Hugo Rodier, M.D., to consult with Trina West, A.F.N.P., 
about David Ragsdale's treatment and prescriptions. 
b. The failure of Hugo Rodier, MX)., to properly monitor, refer, and treat 
David Ragsdale. 
45. The negligence of Hugo Rodier, M.D. was likely to cause the conduct 
toward Kristy Ragsdale that led to her shooting and death. 
46. The failures of Hugo Rodier, M.D., were a direct, proximate, and 
foreseeable cause of the conduct that led to the shooting, as well as death, of Kristy 
Ragsdale. 
47. As a result of the negligence of Hugo Rodier, M.D., Plaintiffs have lost 
the care comfort, society, and support of their parents. 
48. The Plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe emotional 
distress as a result of the negligence of Hugo Rodier, M.D. 
COUNT3 
NEGLIGENCE OF PIONEER COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL CLINIC 
AND JOHN DOES I - X 
49. Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the 
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 48 and further allege as follows: 
50. The failure of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, and John Does I -
X, by and through their agents, staff, nurses and employees, to follow the appropriate 
standard of care includes, but is not limited to: 
a. The failure of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic and John Does I -
X, by and through their agents, staff, employees and nurses to properly monitor, refer, 
and treat David Ragsdale. 
b. The failure of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, by and through its 
agents, staff, employees and nurses to ensure that Trina West, A.F.N.P., was not 
exceeding her ability and authority to prescribe David Ragsdale medications. 
c. The failure of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, by and through its 
agents, staff, employees and nurses to ensure that Trina West, A.F.N.P., and Hugo 
Rodier, M.D., had a proper consultation plan. 
51. The negligence of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic and John Does I 
- X was likely to cause the conduct toward Kristy Ragsdale that led to her shooting and 
death. 
52. The failures of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic were a direct, 
proximate, and foreseeable cause of the conduct that led to the shooting, as well as death, 
ofKristyRagsdale. 
53. As a result of the negligence of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, 
Plaintiffs have lost the care, comfort, society, and support of their parents. 
54. The Plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe emotional 
distress as a result of the negligence of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic. 
COUNT 4 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
55. Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the 
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 54 and further allege as follows: 
56. Plaintiffs claim that the acts or omissions of the defendant Trina West, 
A.F.N.P., Hugo Rodier, M.D., Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic and John Does I -
X, were a result of willful and malicious conduct, or conduct that manifested a knowing 
and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows: 
1. For general and special damages in an amount to be proven at trial; 
2. For interest on special damages from January 6, 2008, to the date of judgment 
herein; 
3. For punitive damages in an amount to be proved at trial; 
5. For costs of suit incurred herein; and 
6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper in the 
premises. 
DATED this z<?&\ day of April, 2010. 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury. 
DATED this &fr\ day of April, 2010. 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
Third Judicial District 
STEPHEN W. OWENS - #6957 
J. KEVIN MURPHY - #5768 (of counsel) 
EPPERSON & OWENS, P.C. 
10 West 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 983-9800 
Telefax: (801) 983-9808 
sovvens(g)eola'woffice.com 
kmurph y (gteolawoffice, com 
Attorneys for Defendant Trina West, A.F.N.P 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
B.R., a minor child, and C.R., a minor child, ] 
through their Conservator WILLIAM M. ] 
JEFFS, ; 
Plaintiffs, ] 
v. ] 
TRINA WEST, A.F.N.P., HUGO RODIER, ; 
M.D., and PIONEER COMPREHENSIVE ] 
MEDICAL CLINIC, ) 
Defendants. ] 
) RULING AND ORDER GRANTING 
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
) DISMISS 
) Civil No. 100907025 
} Judge Denise Lindberg 
Defendant Trina West, A.F.N.P., joined by co-defendants Hugo Rodier, M.D., and 
Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, has moved to dismiss plaintiffs5 complaint under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). These defendants have also moved, alternatively or additionally, for 
summary judgment against plaintiffs under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(b). On December 20, 2010, oral 
argument was heard on these motions, with counsel for all parties present. 
Having reviewed the parties' memoranda and heard oral argument, this Court now rules 
as follows: The Court is persuaded that the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted. 
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RECEIVED 
This is based upon the fact that no patient-health care provider relationship existed, at the time of 
the underlying events, between the plaintiffs - who are the children of David and Rristy 
Ragsdale - and the defendants. The patient was David Ragsdale, who is not a party to this 
lawsuit. The Court is not persuaded that, under the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, the 
non-patient plaintiffs may step into David Ragsdale's shoes to pursue a malpractice lawsuit 
against the defendants. 
In light of its ruling on the motion to dismiss, it is not necessary to decide the defendants' 
alternative motion for summary judgment. However, if this Court were to reach that alternative 
motion, it would deny it. Denial would be based upon the defendants' failure to satisfy all 
requirements for issue preclusion, which they assert as the basis for their alternative motion. 
Specifically, issue preclusion is not satisfied because the plaintiffs in this civil case were not 
parties to the previous, criminal case against David Ragsdale; nor were they in privity with any 
party to that case. 
For the foregoing reasons, and for the additional reasons stated from the bench on 
December 20, 2010, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the motion to 
dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. 
SO ORDERED this_§\_ day of ,]dV\\KPi^ , 2011. 
BY THE COURT 
DENISE LINDBERG 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form 
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For the Defendant: 
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5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 * * * 
7 THE COURT We're on the record on Case 
8 No 100907025 It's the matter of Ragsdale versus Tnna 
9 West, et a! 
10 If 1 can have counsel state your appearances 
11 MR YOUNG Tyler Young for the plaintiff, judge, 
12 with Jonah Orlofsky and Allen Young 
13 MR OWENS Stephen Owens and Kevin Murphy on 
14 behalf of defendant Tnna West 
15 THE COURT Thank you This is defendant's motion 
16 to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment You 
17 may take the podium, and thank you for the courtesy copies 
18 that were submitted earlier 
19 MR OWENS Well, there was a terrible --
20 THE COURT 1 should note that 1 have reviewed the 
21 record 
22 MR OWENS There was a terrible murder in 
23 January 2008, and the murderer is at the state prison serving 
24 20 to life As I articulate our position here, Your Honor, 
25 we think this is a position - an effort to hold a health 
2 
1 care provider liable for her patient's criminal conduct, A, 
2 when the provider has no control or custody over the patient, 
3 and when the patient has taken full responsibility for his 
4 actions 
5 So let me talk about the first one first Andl 
6 apologize that we did this in a supplemental brief as we 
7 prepared for what we thought was the prior hearing a month or 
8 two ago 
9 Your Honor, 1 think this Young case is the most 
10 significant case 
11 THE COURT If you'd wait just a second to make 
12 sure 1 have the full file in front of me 
13 MR OWENS Sure 
14 (Pause in proceedings) 
15 MR OWENS So I'll focus in a minute on Tab 13 and 
16 then Subtab 2 -- or excuse, Subtab 1, Young versus Salt Lake 
17 School District, and then go to page 6, and then on the right 
18 of page 6 let me first just do an overview 
19 If 1 go to the doctor, or in this case a nurse 
20 practitioner, and, again, I'm here on behalf of Tnna West, 
21 nurse practitioner, and that provider gives me a 
22 prescription, the question is -- or provides any treatment, 
23 maybe they operate on me, maybe they do what ever The point 
24 is the provider does not owe a duty to my children 
25 Mr Ragsdale is alive This isn't a wrongful death 
1 case My client's patient is sitting in a locked cell at 
2 Point of the Mountain He's not suing her for medical 
3 malpractice He's not saying she violated care standards, 
4 and yet his children, through a conservator, are 
! 5 Vour Honor, we think this idea, this holding 
i 6 someone liable, a care provider, to a third person turns on 
7 custody and control And under this Young case, Footnote 7 
8 on the right the first indented paragraph, it says, "Control 
9 over or custody of the primary person who caused the injury 
10 is a necessary prerequisite before engaging in a 
11 foreseeability-of-harm analysis" Do you see that? It's the 
12 paragraph that's under second 
13 So a lot of the briefing went into, okay, they pled 
14 foreseeability, that's enough, and we're saying, no, you have 
15 to establish a duty, and to have duty you have to have 
16 custody and control So what are the cases where they've at 
17 least evaluated this? State prisoners, civil commitment of 
18 mental patients, and there's a truck mechanic case where a 
19 truck went out of control, and they sued the brake repair 
20 person that they had custody and control over those brakes 
21 that they were repairing 
22 The two most recent cases that I've seen where they 
23 said no custody and control and therefore we're not even 
24 going down the road of foreseeability was a school district, 
25 which is the Young case, saying essentially a kid got hit by 
4 
1 a car, and they're saying you should have had a crossing 
2 guard and things like that on the way to school or to a 
3 parent-teacher conference, and they said the school didn't 
4 have custody and control over that kid so it couldn't be sued 
5 font 
6 And then there's a more recent case actually, LDS 
7 church case where a member abused someone, and they sued Ihe 
8 church This is Doe V The Corporation of the President of 
9 the Church of jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 98 P 3d 429 
10 And the Court held that there was no duty on behalf of the 
11 church because they didn't have custody and control over the 
12 abuser 
13 That makes sense because from a policy standpoint 
14 let's say I'm a nurse practitioner, and a troubled guy comes 
15 into my office, which they do every day Now let's say, 
16 gosh, he has marital problems, he's got some mental health 
17 problems, I'm not going to touch this guy because if he does 
18 something wrong, if he does some criminal conduct, I'm going 
19 to be on the hook for that And 1 guarantee that's what my 
20 client thinks now when a troubled guy who has marital 
21 problems comes into her office, which they do weekly, and, 
22 she says, well, should 1 give him an antidepressant She's 
23 gun shy, and that's the public policy that's being promoted 
24 here is you're not just responsible for this patient but for 
25 whoever this patient deals with, which doesn't make sense 
MhDV pirrnu- rnn>ir P C D nnn 
1 The second issue, Your Honor, which goes to our 
2 summary judgment motion, goes to this idea that somehow my 
3 client is on the hook for -- should be on the hook for when 
4 my client's patient has taken full responsibility to the tune 
5 of 20 to life m a cage for his wrongful act, for intentional 
6 or knowing misconduct It's interesting, Judge Laycock -
7 and this is Tab 2, Exhibit 2 She's taking his plea, and on 
8 page 12 says "All right And do you understand that by 
9 pleading guilty today you're admitting that you committed the 
10 crime as described in these elements and those elements on 
11 page 11 that you intentionally or knowingly caused the death 
12 of another, Knsty Ragsdale, and that you knowingly created a 
13 great risk of death to a person other than the victim and 
14 you7" And he said, "Yes, Your Honor" 
15 Then at another - as part of that, and this was a 
16 full hour hearing which I'm sure Your Honor has done many 
17 times, but the prosecutor stated, and this is on page 25, 
18 "judge" -- the prosecutor lays out the factual allegation 
19 "Judge, on January 6,2008, the defendant intentionally shot 
20 and killed Knsty Ragsdale, the defendant's wife The murder 
21 occurred in an LDS parking lot in Lehi as Knsty walked from 
22 her car to the chapel doors When Mr Ragsdale initially 
23 shot Knsty, standing behind her several yards were Aaron 
24 Wiggmtons and his two sons A round actually struck the 
25 front grille of the car the Wiggmtons were standing beside 
6 
1 informed, I don't want more time, this is what I want to do, 
2 went through a long colloquy with the Court on those issues, 
3 and now they're having the children's conservator saying, no, 
4 that's not right, that he really was involuntarily 
5 intoxicated 
6 Mr Ragsdale's nowhere to be seen in the suit 
7 Again, that's who my client owed a duty to It's 
8 interesting -- and I won't get into these because for issues 
9 of this hearing their allegations are assumed to be true, 
10 but, suffice it to say, weeks before the murder there's not a 
11 raging lunatic in her office She's telling him I feel the 
12 best I've felt in ten years, but these are issues that are 
13 not best addressed right now 
14 But here is my point Her patient is not unhappy 
15 with her cm evidently He's not in the suit, he's not 
16 suing her, and it would be laughable if he were because he 
17 stood before a court and pleaded to aggravated murder 
18 Your Honor, based on those issues, it would be --1 
19 think on the policy issues it just doesn't make sense to put 
20 that kind of infinite burden on a health care provider trying 
21 to help her patient And we already have someone who was 
22 fully advised, attorneys and experts, saying I'm guilty 
23 without raising an involuntary intoxication defense And 
24 I'll submit it unless you have questions 
25 THE COURT Well, I just my only question ~ 
1 and thereby knowingly created great risk of death to another 
2 "The Court All right And those are the facts as 
3 I remember them from the preliminary hearing Do you admit 
4 that that is what happened7 
5 "The Defendant Yes, Your Honor" 
6 The idea of issue preclusion is an equitable 
7 creation to help the Court, first of all, save judicial 
8 resources, also to prevent basically litigated matters from 
9 being relitigated and possibly having contrary findings 
10 It's not a perfect label here because we don't have obviously 
11 the same party suing the same party, but the prosecutor 
12 worked closely with the victim's family, and the victim's 
13 family signed off on this And as we know with recent 
14 statutes providing certain rights to victims, they were 
15 involved in that at least and felt good about it 
16 So, Your Honor, we're now essentially with these 
17 children's attorney asserting on their behalf that it is not 
18 their dad who murdered their mom, it was their dad's 
19 medications that made their dad murder their mom, which is 
20 contrary to the fully litigated effort with Mr Ragsdale 
21 It's not a small thing to stand before the Court under oath 
22 and say I admit, you know, I'm guilty And this is with the 
23 benefit of several lawyers, with the benefit of several 
24 experts that the defense had retained, he said to the judge I 
25 feel really good about the advice I've received, I feel fully 
:l 
1 obviously the summary judgment motion is as a backup to your 
2 motion to dismiss on the basis of duty 
3 MR OWENS Right We want you to grant both, just 
4 in case you were wondering 
5 THE COURT Well, let's just leave it there for 
6 now Let's see what opposing counsel has to say 
7 MR ORLOFSKY My name is Jonah Orlofsky I'll be 
8 speaking for the plaintiffs 
9 I think I'd like to start by emphasizing two facts 
10 that will play a role in the legal arguments I make that I 
11 think distinguish this case from any of the other cases that 
12 come before it and make this case a fairly extraordinary set 
13 of circumstances from a legal point of view, aside from the 
14 dramatic facts 
15 These are the two facts I want to emphasize First 
16 of all, this is not a case, like most of the cases that have 
17 come before it, where the alleged wrongdoing by a health care 
18 provider was a failure to warn or a failure to keep somebody 
19 in custody, to keep somebody in a mental institution 
20 In all of those cases, the malpractice that was 
21 being alleged was not with respect to how the patient was 
22 being treated, the patient was being treated appropriately 
23 But during the course of the health care provider's 
24 treatment, the health care provider allegedly came across 
25 information that violent conduct was supposedly possible, and 
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR (435) 868-1075 
1 so the claim was that although the health care provider was 
2 providing proper treatment, they also had a duty to either 
3 warn people who might be the victims of some violence, go to 
4 the authorities, or perhaps restrain the person In this 
5 case that's not what's happening here We have alleged that 
6 the malpractice was in connection with the very treatment of 
7 the patient 
8 THE COURT So why isn't the patient, Mr Ragsdale, 
9 a plaintiff? What s your authority to act on behalf of 
10 Mr Ragsdale7 You have none 
11 MR ORLOFSKY That's correct, we have none We're 
12 not representing him, we've not been asked to represent him 
13 We're here on behalf of the guardian of the children, and the 
14 guardian of the children has said that he believes the 
15 children have rights that ought to be pursued, and that's 
16 what we're pursuing here 
17 THE COURT But if you are asserting now that a 
18 critical fact here is malpractice against Mr Ragsdale, the 
19 children do not stand in their father's shoes Their 
conservator does not stand in the shoes So I still fail to 
see how that's relevant to the issue for decision by me 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR ORLOFSKY So the question then is can someboqy22 
other than the patient bring a claim for malpractice7 Is 
that my understanding that's the question that you're 
raising7 
10 
1 that Your Honor is posing, and I'll get to that special 
2 relationship test That's the question of can these children 
3 bring their own malpractice claim when they were not treated 
4 by this physician There's no dispute they were not treated 
5 They are bringing their own claim as if they are bystanders 
6 who were injured by what was done to this patient 
7 THE COURT Okay 
8 MR ORLOFSKY And the argument has been made thai 
9 no, the malpractice law in this state simply limits the case, 
10 only the patient can bring the malpractice claim, and I 
11 believe that's wrong, and I believe there's strong authority 
12 why that's wrong 
13 THE COURT Okay Talk to me about that 
14 MR ORLOFSKY First of all, let's start out with 
15 the authority that supports that argument, and that's the two 
16 cases that are cited 
17 THF COURT Phillips 
18 MR ORLOFSKY Joseph and Wilcox That's Wilcox 
19 versusSaltLakeCity and Joseph versus McCann Those cases, 
20 I think, address a very different question In both of those 
21 cases, someone hired a physician to review the medical 
situation of employees, or in one case it was for people who 
23 wanted to get a license from the state The physicians were 
24 not retained by the person who was being seen by the 
25 physician The physician was retained 
12 
1 THE COURT Well.no 
2 MR ORLOFSKY Can somebody who is injured by a 
3 malpractice but is not the patient, a third party who was 
4 injured or claims to be injured by the malpractice, can that 
5 person make a claim against the doctor7 
6 THE COURT Well, I think that in some 
7 circumstances there's been law -- well, you make your 
8 argument because I don't want to frame it for you I want 
9 you to frame it in whichever way you think you want me to 
10 consider it 
11 MR ORLOFSKY But I'm trying to understand the 
12 question 
13 THE COURT Well, I'm failing to see the point of 
14 why you start out by saying I think this is a critical fact, 
15 and that's all I was just commenting that I don't see it as 
16 a critical fact because of the posture of the case That's 
17 all 
18 MR ORLOFSKY I guess the reason I was emphasizing 
19 that fact is it doesn't go to the issue of whether a 
20 nonpatent can sue a doctor It goes to the different issue 
21 of the special relationship test that the defendants have 
22 been arguing vigorously should apply here, so it went to a 
23 different issue Does that make any sense7 
24 THE COURT Go ahead 
25 MR ORLOFSKY So let me maybe turn to the issue 
1 I don't think they answer the question in this case 
2 because in that case there was no physician/patient 
3 relationship The people who were being seen by the 
4 physician, the physician was hired as a consultant 
5 THE COURT But isn't the critical issue in Joseph, 
6 isn't the crux of the decision of the Court of Appeals in 
7 Joseph that whether a plaintiff bringing a malpractice action 
8 has to show that there's a provider-patient relationship, and 
9 the court said -- to establish a duty of care, and the court 
10 said, yeah, you do So granted that the fact situation --
11 the fact context was different, but the legal point of the 
12 Supreme Court -- of the Court of Appeals' decision in Joseph 
13 is directly on point 
14 MR ORLOFSKY And here's where I suggest that it's 
15 not, and I'll show authorities that I think strongly apply 
16 that it's not, but let me first address the point there 
17 What I think that court was saying is you cannot 
18 have a malpractice claim without a physician-patient 
19 relationship That does not answer the question of when 
20 there is a physician-patient relationship and there has been 
21 malpractice towards the patient are there third parties who 
22 can bring a claim because they, too, were injured by that 
23 malpractice What that case was holding is there was no 
24 physician-patient relationship A physician was not seeing a 
25 patient for the purposes of providing medical care, and 
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1 without a physician-patient relationship, quite logically how 
2 can you have a malpractice claim The physician was not 
3 treating a patient They were reviewing xrays for someone 
4 who had hired them on a contractual basis as a consultant 
5 So there's one question, can you ever have a 
6 malpractice claim if there's no physician-patient 
7 relationship Those cases clearly say no, and I think you'll 
8 find all around the country courts say the same thing It's 
9 a different question when there is a physician-patient 
10 relationship can a third party bring a claim saying I was 
11 injured by that malpractice, too That's a different 
12 question that was not answered by those cases 
13 Now let me give you some evidence of why I think 
14 the case law says that it was not answered Let's take the 
15 Higgins case Higgins versus Salt Lake County is one of the 
16 cases the defendants rely a lot on It's one of those mental 
17 health patient cases That's a case where the court held 
18 that before you can bring a claim for being injured by a 
19 mental health patient, you need to show a special 
20 relationship The plaintiff in that case was not the person 
21 who was being treated by the mental health authorities It 
22 was third parties 
23 In that case there was a girl who had been stabbed 
24 The defendants in Higgins were a doctor and a nurse, very 
25 much like this case A nurse was the primary care Now 
14 
1 they're suing a nurse saying that your mental health patient 
2 stabbed me Does the Supreme Court say, no, case over, 
3 you're not the patient, you can't bring a claim? What 
4 authority do you have to bring a claim? Exactly situated as 
5 we were 
6 And the court went on to do its more complex 
7 analysis about whether there's a special relationship 
8 Clearly the underlying assumption is that a nonpatent can 
9 sue a health care provider if the appropriate tort claims are 
10 met, if the appropriate requirements In that case it needed 
11 special relationship, and I'll get into that in a moment 
12 whether we need that here, but Higgins is a Utah Supreme 
13 Court case, and the defendants were a doctor and a nurse 
14 And, indeed, all of those cases that the defendants 
15 rely upon in those mental health cases they rely on Fand 
16 (phonetic) versus State of Utah, Rollins versus Petersen, 
17 Wilson versus Valley Mental Health All of those cases were 
18 tort claims brought by the victims of mental health patients 
19 And yet the court never once did what apparently the 
20 defendants would suggest, easy case, throw it out, they 
21 weren't the victims of the malpractice, but the court did 
22 not 
23 Now, the court didn't say we don't require a 
24 doctor-patient relationship because that was limited to cases 
25 where people employ doctors for different reasons, but it's 
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1 clearly the only way you can explain all those results by the 
2 Utah Supreme Court So that's one bit of evidence I think is 
3 very clear that it implies what I'm saying is the correct 
4 interpretation of those two appellate court decisions 
5 The other bit of authority we bring is the 
6 malpractice statute As we've pointed out, the statute of 
7 limitations in medical malpractice cases, that's Code 
8 78B-3-404, talks about the time for plaintiffs or patients to 
9 bring claims And, again, the implication of the argument 
10 made by the defendants is that no one other than a patient 
11 can ever make a claim for malpractice, and yet that statute 
12 clearly implies that you're going to have other people other 
13 than the patients bringing the claims 
14 THE COURT But that language -- the quoted 
15 language permits a nonpatent to bring a suit under a 
16 malpractice act, but I don't think anything in that section 
17 suggests that the doctor owes a duty to nonpatents in the 
18 malpractice context There's nothing in tnat statute that 
19 says that That particular quote is not being -- it's not 
20 attempting to define plaintiff in that section, but, anyway, 
21 that particular quote does not address the duty issue 
22 MR ORLOFSKY Well, there are two separate 
23 questions What the defendants have made is two arguments 
24 They first said in effect you don't even look to see if 
25 there's a duty A doctor can never owe a duty to anyone 
16 
1 other than the patient he or she is treating That's their 
2 first position, and that's been suggested by some of the 
3 questions, can you ever owe a duty to someone other than the 
4 patient you're treating And if a plaintiff, other than a 
5 patient, can bring a malpractice action, that means a duty 
6 can be owed to other people 
7 There's a separate question about whether we meet 
8 that here, but I think what that statute does is it says the 
9 absolute position that only patients are owed duties, 
10 therefore, only patients can bring claims against physicians 
11 can't be correct 
12 THE COURT Okay 
13 MR ORLOFSKY Let me cite one other thing that I 
14 think gets even more to the heart of it That is a 
15 statute - 1 guess you could call it the duty to warn 
16 statute The defendants have cited this It's 78B-3-502 
17 It's entitled limitation of the therapist's duty to warn 
18 THE COURT Right 
19 MR ORLOFSKY That statute doesn't directly apply 
20 here 
21 THE COURT Let me find it 
22 MR ORLOFSKY I can't cite you in the materials 
23 where it is 
24 THE COURT I don't have it right here lt's78B? 
25 MR ORLOFSKY 78B-3-502 It's 501 and 502 I'll 
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1 be speaking about both sections 
2 THE COURT Okay 
3 MR ORLOFSKY Now, this statute doesn't directly 
4 apply here because, as I said, we're not dealing with a 
5 failure to warn case We're dealing with malpractice in the 
6 actual treatment of the patient that caused the patient to 
7 become violent But here's why this statute is important 
8 This was a statute where the legislature was trying 
9 to help out people providing care to mental health patients 
10 in order to curtail somewhat their liability What does this 
11 statute mean? When did this statute ever apply? When would 
12 you ever have a tort claim based on a failure to warn 
13 somebody that a mental health patient might be violent7 
14 The only situation that's going to arise in is 
15 where there's been somebody who's been injured by a mental 
16 health patient I can't think of any other situation in 
17 which this statute applies Maybe there's some other, but 
18 that's clearly the predominant reason the legislature passed 
19 this, because they knew that you can bring in Utah a claim if 
20 you're the victim of injuries from a mental health patient 
21 against the health care providers, and they wanted to curtail 
22 that, and they wanted to make it a little more clear when the 
23 failure to give notice would give rise to a cause of action 
24 But if the people who are injured by mental health patients 
25 can't ever show that there was a duty owed to them, can't 
18 
1 ever bring a claim for malpractice against the health care 
2 providers, you don't need this statute 
3 This statute is very closely related to the Higgins 
4 case where you had the victim of a mental health patient's 
5 actions bringing an action against the doctor and a nurse 
6 Now, there was a question as to what you have to show to show 
7 that there's a duty owed because the courts have said not 
8 anybody can bring that cause of action But, again, the 
9 first step is a duty can clearly be owed to people who are 
10 the victims of violence by mental health patients 
11 Now, I think that raises -- and I want to point out 
12 one other thing while here on the statute It's a little off 
13 track, but we're on the statute and I think it's important 
14 because there's been a lot of talk about the policy 
15 considerations here about chilling nurses and doctors from 
16 providing mental health care because they fear the 
17 liabilities they may be imposed with 
18 In the statute where the Utah legislature was 
19 attempting to curtail one type of claim against health care 
20 providers to mental health patients, that being a failure to 
21 warn, they were very clear in who was to get this protection 
22 Not the defendants in this case Why? With respect -- there 
23 were two defendants, one was a nurse, one was a doctor The 
24 statute provides a protection to psychiatrist's license 
25 That's definition Section 501(1) because that's how they 
1 define therapist, a psychiatrist, but the statute does not 
2 include within its protections physicians who are not trained 
3 as psychiatrists Then down in Subsection 5 they include 
4 within the protection a psychiatric and mental health nurse 
5 specialist licensed to practice advanced psychiatric nursing 
6 The nurse in this case did not have that qualification 
7 So in other words, when the Utah legislature went 
8 to put some limits on one type of cause of action that could 
9 be brought against health care providers when a mental health 
10 patient commits a physical injury, these were not the people 
11 who were entitled to that protection 
12 So the Utah legislature had one of two things in 
13 mind Either they never anticipated that people with these 
14 kind of credentials would be treating someone in this kind of 
15 situation, or they felt that if they were they were not 
16 entitled to any particular additional protection from the 
17 State I think that's a powerful policy statement as to what 
18 the Utah legislature considers when defendants such as these 
19 are treating people in this kind of situation 
20 This was a very complicated psychiatric situation 
21 Six different drugs were prescribed Our evidence will show 
22 that these people never should have been involved in treating 
23 a case of this kind, rather a specialist should have been 
24 But retreating back to the point here, this statute 
25 shows that the legislature clearly knew that patients - that 
20 
1 victims of patients would be suing Now the question is what 
2 do we have to show to show a duty Can anybody who's injured 
3 by a mental health patient show a duty? What is the legal 
4 standard that we have to meet in our pleading in order to 
5 make that cause of action, and there are a couple of 
6 different lines of authority out there 
7 I think there are two lines of authority that are 
8 potentially applicable, and I'll argue why I think one The 
9 first case that we've cited is Cruz versus Middlekauff 
10 That's a Utah Supreme Court case That's not a case 
11 involving a mental health situation That's the case, Your 
12 Honor, involving a car dealership that left cars with keys in 
13 the ignition, and they left the cars running there The car 
14 was stolen The thief went on a high-speed chase with the 
15 police and crashed into someone and injured them The people 
16 who were injured by the thief sued the car dealership, and 
17 they said you owed us a duty And not surprisingly the car 
18 dealership said, wait a minute, there was a criminal act 
19 here That's an intervening event that breaks the chain of 
20 causation We can't be liable for a criminal act 
21 And the Supreme Court looked at that carefully and 
22 said and I'll quote Many jurisdictions have held that 
23 under special or unusual circumstances a duty may exist where 
24 a defendant should reasonably anticipate that its conduct 
25 will create an unreasonably enhanced danger to one in the 
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1 position of the injured plaintiff If such danger is 
2 foreseeable, then a duty arises to exercise reasonable care 
3 for the safety of others 
4 What they went on to say in that case is it needed 
5 to be foreseeable that your conduct would lead to criminal 
6 conduct that could injure people That's Cruz versus 
7 Middlekauff Now. we believe that that is the standard that 
8 we have to meet in order to show that there's a duty owed to 
9 a third party Is there some different standard applicable 
10 to health care providers7 I don't believe there's ever been 
11 a case showing a different standard applicable to health care 
12 providers 
13 Now. whether the cases the defendants cite for some 
14 sort of different standards, those are those series of cases 
15 involving mental health patients, the four cases There's 
16 the Higgins case, the Wilson case and those four cases, the 
17 Fand case and the Rollins case All of those cases talked 
18 about whether or not to show a duty when there was a criminal 
19 act When a mental health patient committed a violent act. 
20 you had to show what they call a special relationship I 
21 don't see how the defendants escape the Webb case from the 
22 Supreme Court, which we discussed in our brief, which held 
23 that a special requirement was only required in two 
24 situations One. a government worker, government workers get 
25 special protection, and, two, a tort case that was based on 
22 
1 omission rather than the affirmative act of the defendant 
2 It's the Webb versus University of Utah case, and it's a 2005 
3 case, and it's really the definitive discussion of this term 
4 "special relationship" And what it says is. "The Court of 
5 Appeals correctly observed that as a general proposition of 
6 tort law the distinction between acts and omissions essential 
7 to assessing whether a duty is owed a plaintiff In almost 
8 every instance an act carries with it a potential duty and 
9 resulting legal accountability for that act By contrast, an 
10 omission or failure can generally give rise to liability only 
11 in the presence of some external circumstance, a special 
12 relationship" 
13 Then they also talk about how special relationship 
14 is also needed if it's a government worker, the reason being 
15 we don't want government workers liable to the general 
16 public If you look at those four cases involving people who 
17 were the victims of mental health patients suing, they all 
18 involved cases against government workers, or it was a case 
19 of omission where somebody failed to do something None of 
20 those cases involve a case against a private plaintiff, a 
21 private plaintiff who committed an affirmative act of 
22 malpractice as we've alleged here 
23 That gets way back to the beginning where I was 
24 saying it's important that in this case we're not dealing 
25 with a failure to warn We are dealing with the prescription 
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1 of the wrong drugs, drugs that are alleged to have been a 
2 substantial cause of the violent outburst of this person I 
3 see no authority where someone like that has to meet some 
4 higher test other than what's in Cruz versus Middlekauff 
5 The test is was it foreseeable It's got to be foreseeable 
6 It can't just be that you commit a negligent act and a 
7 criminal act occurs You have to be able to foresee that 
8 THE COURT We have-- counsel just barely 
9 addressed that issue on the case he referred me to. turning 
10 back to it So what is your response then to Young7 
11 MR ORLOFSKY Government actor, school district. 
12 fits right within the Webb case It's three years before 
13 Webb, by the way I believe that's 2002 
14 THE COURT Yeah 
15 MR ORLOFSKY It's three years before, but it fits 
16 right in the Webb scenario That's a government act And 
17 what the courts have said is that government people are 
18 always acting in the public's interest, and we can't ha\/e 
19 them hold a duty to the public at large So what they do in 
20 the special relationship test is they narrow the duty of 
21 government workers to where you know they're a specific 
22 identifiable group of people who are in danger And they 
23 also narrow it to the situation in the mental health 
24 institutions where if someone has you in custody, it's a 
25 little unclear exactly they're saying as to whether you need 
24 
1 to be in custody, but in any case that Young case was a 
2 government case, and the Webb case is very clear on that 
3 It points out that the special relationship term 
4 has generated some confusion because it's used in several 
5 different ways, but it really says there's three different 
6 scenarios that you can have is what Webb says One, private 
7 actor, not government actor who commits an affirmative act of 
8 misconduct, no special relationship needed If the harm is 
9 foreseeable, that creates a duty Second scenario, private 
10 individual who omits to do something, a failure to act You 
11 need a special relationship Government worker, whether it's 
12 omission, commission, any kind of claim against a government 
13 worker, you need a special relationship You need something 
14 more, something enhanced And what Young is saying is in 
15 those footnotes if you've got someone in custody, that's one 
16 of the ways you can create a special relationship, and that 
17 kind of makes sense At that point you're now in a different 
18 position than somebody who doesn't have custody or control, 
19 but all of those that are doctrines that are applied to 
20 either government cases, cases against governmental 
21 defendants, or they apply to private actors who have failed 
22 to act which is entitled to some more protection than as we 
23 have here, an actual affirmative act 
24 There was one other case that the defendant cited, 
25 Doe, I believe I don't think we've seen that case I think 
25 
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1 that was cited for the first time in court today or am I 
2 wrong? 
3 MR OWENS It cites the Young case 
4 MR ORLOFSKY But that case I haven't seen that 
5 other case that he mentioned. Your Honor, so I can't comment 
6 on that 
7 I can briefly address the collateral estoppel 
8 issue Do you have any more questions on that initial 
9 argument? 
10 THE COURT No 
11 MR ORLOFSKY I'll be very brief on that one I 
12 think that one's been briefed pretty well, and there are 
13 several requirements of collateral estoppel that we feel are 
14 not met. and the first is not the same parties, the second is 
15 not the same issue, and the third is the issue was not 
16 litigated 
17 Let me just focus on the fact that we don't have 
18 the same party here It's one thing to talk about equitable 
19 considerations but we have a very clear test for collateral 
20 estoppel, and that is you need to be the same party I don't 
21 think anyone is claiming that the plaintiffs here were 
22 parties to the criminal proceeding The victims right 
23 statute gives them a right to chat with the prosecutor to 
24 provide input, but no one has said that that makes you a 
25 party 
26 
1 There is an exception You don't have to be a 
2 party if you dfe in privity with a party And privity has 
3 been defined pretty clearly by the Supreme Court In the BYU 
4 versus Tremco case that we've just cited, privity basically 
5 means you have to have the identical interest So your 
6 claim, your interests were fully litigated in that prior 
7 proceeding And the examples they've given of that are a 
8 guardian and a ward, a trustee and a beneficiary, corporate 
9 affiliates like a parent and a subsidiary So if the 
10 subsidiary is in a lawsuit, the parent can't come in and say 
11 we want to relitigate that issue again You were in the same 
12 shoes as the party that was litigating 
13 You can't say that with the victim of a crime and 
14 the prosecution The prosecution's interests are for the 
15 State They're trying to prosecute crimes, make sure there 
16 is punishment, make sure the State's interests are taken care 
17 of The victims have a whole set of different interests 
18 They may overlap, both people may be interested in a 
19 conviction, but you cannot say that the victims of a crime 
20 have the identical interests with the prosecution, and no 
21 case that I'm aware of has ever said anything remotely like 
22 that 
23 Again, we'll stand on our briefs on the other two 
24 points of collateral estoppel, but I'll leave it at that 
25 point That point I think they don't get past 
1 THE COURT All right, thank you Your response 
2 MR OWENS Your Honor, say this afternoon I go to 
3 see my doctor and my doctor prescribes me a medication, and I 
4 go home and I have side effects from that medication Can my 
5 children sue my doctor7 That is this case Let's say I'm 
6 given an antidepressant and it's going to make me grumpy at 
7 first, so I go home and I'm grumpy, and my kids say. dang 
8 that doctor. I'm suing you That is tnis case on a much more 
9 dramatic field 
10 It doesn't make sense on policy - they spent half 
11 their time talking about there are exceptions There are 
12 exceptions I mean, if I kill my patient, my patient's 
13 family can sue me If there's a loss of consortium. 
14 possibility where I'm not the direct patient and I have a 
15 claim There are statutory things There are mental health 
16 things If I tell my therapist I'm going to go home and kill 
17 my wife, my therapist -- there's confidentiality there's all 
18 kinds of privileges 
19 THE COURT Instead of giving me all these 
20 hypothetical, why don't you address the specific legal 
21 points that counsel has made 
22 MR OWENS Okay I never heard custody and 
23 control It's my whole argument The Young case does not 
24 say if you are a government actor It says control over or 
25 custody of the primary person who caused the injury is the 
28 
1 necessary prerequisite before engaging in a 
2 foreseeability-of-harm analysis The Doe case which we just 
3 in preparation for this hearing just did a WestLaw thing on 
4 whose side ~ 
5 THE COURT I will say I have not received that I 
6 haven't seen that, and I would never have viewed it coming 
7 this late at the conclusion of briefing 
8 MR OWENS Fair enough Enough to say it's the 
9 LDS church being sued for a sex member -- a member who's 
10 committed a sex crime, and they quote the Young language 
11 oerfectly, and that's not a government actor 
12 The last several cases talk about custody and 
13 control, custody and control The Cruz case I acknowledge 
14 does not say that I was a clerk for justice Howe when that 
15 was written I recall it doesn't say that, but I think it 
16 would be decided under a little different standard today I 
17 mean, those words aren't used in the Cruz case, but they are 
18 used m the most recent cases that are close to our case 
19 THE COURT So your argument is I should disregard 
20 controlling law because more recent controlling law says 
21 something different without overruling Cruz is your argument 
22 MR OWENS Right I think these are much closer 
23 cases -- these are cases that have dealt with the special 
24 relationship duty in much more detail than that case did 
25 And I could say. well, the car dealership had custody and 
1 control over their cars that [hey keep leaving keys in. but 
2 the fact is that wording is not -- does not appear to be 
3 important in Cruz whereas it does in these most recent 
4 cases 
5 And I think they just -- well. I'd be speculating 
6 on why the Supreme Court has focused that analysis, but I 
7 think they focused that analysis It's not enough just to 
8 say foreseeability You've got to have some control, which 
9 makes per sense If I am a patient and I go harm someone, 
10 for that person to harm they have to show that the health 
11 care provider actually had some control, and that's why you 
12 get into prisoners and mental patients because there's 
13 custody and control issues there 
14 THE COURT Which fits right in with opposing 
15 counsel's argument that that's a unique category of cases 
16 MR OWENS Well. I don't see in the cases where it 
17 talks about this is only for government, but the fact is the 
18 only people who generally have custody and control over 
19 people are government entities unless --1 guess I couid 
20 civilly commit my patient, and then under that scenario if I 
21 decide to let my patient out 
22 I guess I'm getting a little off track here, but my 
23 whole argument is there's no custody and control How can --
24 what do we expect my client to do? She's got a troubled guy 
25 who's got some mental health issues, so. oh. boy. I think 
30 
1 lawsuit, but the faa is tnat was fully litigated with much 
2 more severe -- here we're just talking about money Tnere 
3 we're talking about potential capital murder charges, so 
4 pretty big incentives 
5 And I know it's just contrary to --1 think we're 
6 going to end up witn if they were to prevail basically it 
7 puts his conviction in question and subject to review on a 
8 petition I don't think that's their goal The family was 
9 delighted when he stood there and took full responsibility 
10 for this murder and declared such I mean -- anyway. I'll 
11 submit it on those things Thank you Your Honor 
12 THE COURT Thank you Give me a few minutes to 
13 kind of organize my thoughts, and I'll be back 
14 (Whereupon, a recess was taken) 
15 THE COURT This is an incredibly interesting case, 
16 and it's one that has mentally required me to delve a bit 
17 into the, you know, look at the case law out also consider 
18 the policy judgments, the policy issues that underlie the 
19 legal direction 
20 At the end of the day. I am persuaded that the 
21 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted And for me. it 
22 really does hinge on the fact that there is no 
23 provider-patient relationship here between these particular 
24 providers and either the children or their conservator And 
25 in my judgment, much as in the case of Joseph, the existence 
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1 he's going to harm someone I'm going to arrest him I 
2 mean, we don't do that She prescribes medications that will 
3 help knowing she could be sued by that patient Mr Ragsdale 
4 is not unhappy with his care evidently, and that's my live 
5 patient That's who I owe my duty to It's a real stretch 
6 to say because his kids are unhappy they can sue 
7 With regard to the family - excuse me, the victims 
8 rights privity issue. I believe this Court has authority 
9 under an equitable basis to say that issue was fully 
10 litigated 
11 THE COURT You're barking up the wrong tree there 
12 I don't see it Don't go there 
13 MR OWENS I li reject tnat, and I'll assert tne 
14 victims rights statutes permitting and requiring tneir 
15 cooperation and in this case their assent So it wasn't like 
16 they just had input They affirmatively agreed --
17 THE COURT That was the grandparents They were 
18 not conservators 
19 MR OWENS We're essentially saying the convicted 
20 fefon who says the medications did not make me do it could be 
21 overturned in a civil proceeding by saying the medications 
22 made him do it That's contrary. I think, to iaw, to 
23 judicial economy, to everything And, you know, I guess I 
24 could bring in Ragsdale. I could bring in the State of Utah 
25 and have them kind of defend what they did there in this 
1 of that relationship was dispositive I believe it is 
2 dispositive here And I just have to say that I'm not 
3 persuaded by plaintiff's argument that they can somehow all 
4 that they need to do is establish that there is a 
5 relationship, a doctor-patient relationship that existed out 
6 there between Ragsdale and the providers and that that's 
7 enough for them to then somehow step into that for purposes 
8 of triggering a duty analysis I just don't see it I may 
9 be wrong, and the appellate court may tell me so. but I don't 
10 believe that they can step in -- that the conservator or the 
11 children can steo into Mr Ragsdale's shoes for pjrposes of 
12 asserting that And notably Mr Ragsdale isn't here 
13 I m also not persuaded oy the citation to the 
14 malpractice act That does not lead me to the inference that 
15 plaintiffs would have me draw To be sure, the statute of 
16 limitations language acknowledges that somebody other than a 
17 patient can bring an action, but as has been noted, there are 
18 contexts under which somebody else that's been injured may 
19 sue, but nothing in there addresses or vitiates the duty to 
20 establish a duty -- vitiate the need for establismng a duty 
21 to the individual 
22 And if I were to reach the issue of summary 
23 judgment, I frankly would deny a summary judgment because I 
24 am not persuaded that we have nere privity and identity So 
25 the fact that the grandoarents were consulted and agreed, I 
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don't believe that that is binding in any event on the 
conservator And even with their agreement, their agreement 
is not binding -- they are entitled to be consulted, they're 
entitled to provide input as representatives of the victim's 
children, but their decision would have not been binding on 
the prosecutor and the actions the prosecutor would have 
taken And so were I not persuaded that the duty issue makes 
this matter fall, I would have held that summary judgment 
also should be denied, but anyway So that's my ruling 
And I will admit that there is an issue around the 
language of Cruz, and that is, you know, that language has 
not been removed, but I think more recent case law I do find 
it persuasive that more recent case law, focused in a more 
tailored manner in more analogous type of situations requires 
that relationship, that duty of relationship there 
(Whereupon, the proceedings concluded at 
2 50 p m ) 
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